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Only Connect: The Right to Community
and the Individual Liberty Interest in State-
Sponsored Racial Integration
Aderson Bellegarde Francois*
Only connect! That was the whole of her sermon. Only connect the
prose and the passion, and both will be exalted, and human love will
be seen at its height. Live in fragments no longer.
Introduction
On June 28, 2007, the United States Supreme Court used two
companion decisions captioned Parents Involved in Community Schools
v. Seattle School District No. 1, and Meredith v. Jefferson County Board
2of Education, to put an end to the mission of racial integration it had
began a little over half century earlier in Brown v. Board of Education.
3
For a brief moment the Court had embraced that mission as a national
privilege, but it soon began to tire of it as a jurisprudential burden and,
truth be told, in recent years, the Court had pursued racial integration in
public schools with something less than a full heart.4 So, in a majority
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collaboration on the Howard Civil Rights Clinic amicus brief in Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007), served as the
impetus for this essay; to Professor Lisa Crooms, whose teaching and scholarship on
human rights provided its inspiration; and above all to Professor Robert Ackerman,
whose invitation to the communitarian section of AALS made this publication possible.
The author also thanks Laquisha Douglas and Lindsay Coker for their invaluable research
and editing help.
1. E. M. FORSTER, HOWARDS END 186-87 (Vintage Books 1954) (1910).
2. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738
(2007).
3. See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I).
4. The notion that the Supreme Court's mission of racial integration was not taken
up with a full heart is neither original nor, I would hope, controversial. By now, it has
passed into legend that, in commenting on the Court's famous dictate in Brown II that
public schools desegregate with "all deliberate speed," Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S.
294, 301 (1955) (Brown I1), Justice Thurgood Marshall often remarked that: "After all
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opinion, authored by Chief Justice John Roberts and joined in relevant
parts by Justices Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, and Alito, the Court stopped
the pretense of enforcing Brown and struck down as a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution the voluntary use of race by public school districts to
achieve a measure of racial integration in primary and secondary
schools.5
In the days and weeks following the decision, civil rights advocates
took great pains to interpret the opinion as a significant victory, insisting
that, while the Court may have struck down the specific plans at issue in
Seattle, Washington, and Louisville, Kentucky, it actually affirmed the
more general-and more consequential-principle that state-sponsored
racial integration can amount to a compelling state interest. 6 Indeed,
these years, I've finally figured out what 'all deliberate speed' really means. S-l-o-w."
WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION'S ToP LEGAL
EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA'S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION 213 (Jack M. Balkin
ed., 2001). This may or may not be an apocryphal story, but the fact does remain that the
Court's full-hearted commitment to desegregation and racial equality was relatively
short-lived. Professors Anthony Amsterdam and Jerome Brunner put it best in their
brilliant book, Minding The Law, in explaining how the Court backed away from the
promise of Brown:
It began deciding cases under the federal civil rights statutes in a way that
consistently subordinated their objective of creating economic opportunities for
African-Americans to the competing interests of whites. It took to using the
Equal Protection Clause to strike down race-specific governmental actions
initially aimed at rectifying centuries of discrimination against African-
Americans. And it justified doing so with elegant paeans to color-blindness
that rival Plessy for unworldliness. In school cases, too, the Court retreated to a
Plessy-like formalism, first reducing Brown to a formula and then turning the
formula into a departure rite by which the federal courts were to find racially-
impacted ghetto schools "inevitable" and terminate desegregation efforts with
desegregation unachieved.
ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 273 (2000).
5. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2746. I do not believe it to be an
exaggeration to say that in recent years the Court's attempts at enforcing Brown had
turned into a pretense. James Baldwin once wrote:
what is honored in a country is cultivated there. If we apply this touchstone to
American life we can scarcely fail to arrive at a very grim view of it. But I
think we have to look grim facts in the face because if we don't, we can never
hope to change them.
James Baldwin, In Search of a Majority, in JAMES BALDWIN, THE PRICE OF THE TICKET
231 (1985). For all the accolades that are usually heaped upon it, the fact is Brown has
been honored mainly in the breach and one would be hard pressed to argue in all
seriousness that the Court has "cultivated" the mission of racial integration. "Grim facts"
indeed, but we might as well face them honestly if we hope to change them.
6. The narrative that the "war" had been won focused especially on the beneficial
impact of the decision on higher education. For example, in response to the Court's
opinion, Professor Charles J. Ogletree Jr., in a New York Times interview stated: "The
hidden story in the decision today is that Justice Kennedy refused to follow the lead of
the other four justices in eviscerating the legacy of Brown." Adam Liptak, The Same
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having submitted an amicus brief together with my colleague, Derek
Black, on behalf of the Civil Rights Clinic at Howard University School
of Law in support of the voluntary integration plans, I count myself
among those who publicly pushed the narrative that a minor battle had
been lost but the major war had been won.7 Yet, the fact that five
justices appeared to endorse the notion of racial integration as a
compelling state interest can hardly obscure the reality that, in the wake
of these decisions, there remains no viable mechanism for enforcing
Brown, and that this so-called compelling state interest will probably
remain something to be paid ceremonial curtsy to but never to be
honored, much less enforced, in actual practice. 8
If Brown's passing went relatively un-noticed and un-mourned, it
was in no small part because of the false hope held out by two sentences
in a concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy, who, while agreeing with
the Roberts majority that the school plans at issue were not sufficiently
narrowly tailored to pass strict scrutiny, also declined to join the
majority's conclusion that racial integration in and of itself does not
Words, but Differing Views, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2007, at A24. John C. Brittain, chief
counsel for the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights under Law, argued that Justice
Kennedy's seeming embrace of diversity as a compelling state interest in the context of
primary and secondary public schools would in fact cement its use in higher education: "I
think higher education came out as one of the big winners in this decision." Peter
Schmidt, High Court Leaves Michigan Cases Intact, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash.,
D.C.), July 6, 2007, at Al. For its part, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund declared on its
website:
It is critically important to realize that today's decision does not categorically
reject the use of race-conscious measures, or hold that it is unconstitutional for
school districts to take steps, including steps that have a racial component, to
create racially and ethnically diverse schools. While this split decision has both
positive and negative implications for our nation and Constitution, we are very
pleased that a majority of the Justices recognize educational diversity and
overcoming our history of segregation to be compelling governmental
interests-among our country's highest priorities-that can be pursued through
careful race-conscious efforts.
NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Statement from the NAACP Legal Defense Fund on the
Supreme Court's Rulings in Seattle and Louisville School Cases (June 28, 2007),
http://www.naacpldf.org/content.aspx?article=1 181 (last visited Apr. 11, 2008).
7. See, e.g., Stephanie Francis Ward, Schools Cast About for New Diversity Plans,
ABA J. REPORT, July 6, 2007, http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/jy6school.html
(interviewing author).
8. See James Ryan, The Supreme Court and Voluntary School Integration, 121
HARV. L. REV. 131, 132-33 (2007) ("One reason why integration has faded from view is
the Court itself. Beginning with Brown 11 and continuing through Parents Involved, the
Court has managed-despite some good intentions-to make meaningful integration
harder rather than easier to achieve. And it has failed, throughout the entire half-century
of desegregation cases, to confront the primary contemporary cause of single-race
schools: residential segregation. Partly as a result of the Court's decisions and partly as a
result of its evasions, most school districts today could not integrate, even if they wanted
to, because their students are primarily if not exclusively of one race or ethnicity.").
2008]
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constitute a compelling state interest.9 In so doing, Justice Kennedy
formed an implicit majority, together with Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer in finding that racial integration under certain
circumstances might indeed satisfy the compelling interest prong of strict
scrutiny.' 0 Thus, Justice Kennedy wrote that, however badly tailored the
Seattle and Louisville plans may have been, it nonetheless remained that:
This Nation has a moral and ethical obligation to fulfill its historic
commitment to creating an integrated society that ensures equal
opportunity for all of its children. A compelling interest exists in
avoiding racial isolation, an interest that a school district, in its
discretion and expertise, may choose to pursue.II
In the light of this moral and ethical obligation, Justice Kennedy
reasoned that a school plan that aimed to achieve racial integration but
eschewed direct classification of students by race might pass
constitutional muster. 12 As to the sort of non-race-conscious measures a
future court might deem constitutional, Justice Kenney indicated that
school districts could attempt to desegregate through the strategic site
selection of new schools, drawing attendance zones, allocating resources,
recruiting students and faculty and tracking enrollments, performance
and other statistics by race; and in regard to such measures, strict
scrutiny might not even apply.
13
As at least one commentator has already pointed out, the practical
difficulty with Justice Kennedy's opinion is that a school district with a
plan to use race in assigning individual students would have to first
9. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2797 (Kennedy, J. concurring in part and
concurring in judgment).
10. See id. at 2800 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
11. Id. at 2797 (Kennedy, J. concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
12. Id. (Kennedy, J. concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ("The decision
today should not prevent school districts from continuing the important work of bringing
together students of different racial, ethnic, and economic backgrounds. Due to a variety
of factors-some influenced by government, some not-neighborhoods in our
communities do not reflect the diversity of our Nation as a whole. Those entrusted with
directing our public schools can bring to bear the creativity of experts, parents,
administrators, and other concerned citizens to find a way to achieve the compelling
interests they face without resorting to widespread governmental allocation of benefits
and burdens on the basis of racial classifications.").
13. Id. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
("School boards may pursue the goal of bringing together students of diverse
backgrounds and races through other means, including strategic site selection of new
schools; drawing attendance zones with general recognition of the demographics of
neighborhoods; allocating resources for special programs; recruiting students and faculty
in a targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments, performance, and other statistics by race.
These mechanisms are race conscious but do not lead to different treatment based on a
classification that tells each student he or she is to be defined by race, so it is unlikely any
of them would demand strict scrutiny to be found permissible.").
[Vol. 112:4
ONLY CONNECT
show, as higher education institutions did in Grutter,'4 that other
measures were ineffective and would also have to make certain to
include, again as Grutter institutions are obligated to do, factors other
than race.' 5 Since these school districts, unlike Grutter institutions, do
not actually purport to engage in substantive evaluations of students, it is
difficult to imagine the factors, which when added to race, would indeed
result in the level of racial integration that could be achieved with a
straightforward racial classification. Justice Kennedy himself was not at
all clear on the point, though he did suggest in passing those additional
factors might include demographic measures, special talents and special
needs.' 6 Moreover, while Justice Kennedy may have approved of these
measures as something new or innovative, the reality is that school
districts around the country have tried them only to find time and time
again that they are less effective and more difficult to administer than the
direct racial measures that courts and communities have always used to
desegregate public schools.'
7
But quite apart from the impracticality of devising and
administering non-directly-race-conscious measures to meet Justice
Kennedy's vision of the narrowly-tailored test, there remains a deeper
and more troubling flaw in Justice Kennedy's ringing endorsement of
racial integration as a compelling state interest, an endorsement
embodied in the statement that "this Nation has a moral and ethical
obligation to fulfill its historic commitment to creating an integrated
society that ensures equal opportunity for all of its children."' 8
To begin with, as no less than Justice Thomas pointed out in his
14. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
15. See Ryan, supra note 8, at 138-39 ("What Justice Kennedy actually seems to
dislike, therefore, is any overt use of race not simultaneously accompanied by
consideration of other factors. Although there is little if any practical difference between
considering race as one of a number of factors and using race as a tiebreaker-under both
approaches, race will certainly be dispositive in some cases-Justice Kennedy prefers the
consideration of race to be obscured as much as possible. Thus, after chastising Jefferson
County for not being more precise in explaining how race is used in student assignments,
Justice Kennedy seems ultimately to invite obfuscation by endorsing the use of race-
neutral proxies or the consideration of race along with a m6lange of other, vaguely
described factors.").
16. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment).
17. See The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. et al., Looking to the
Future: Voluntary K-12 School Integration, A Manual for Parents, Educators, and
Advocates 20-25 (2005), available at http://www.naacpldf.org/content/pdf/voluntary/
VoluntaryK-12_SchoolIntegrationManual.pdf (providing a discussion of the
effectiveness of race-conscious and non race-conscious remedies in voluntary school
integration plans).
18. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment).
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own concurring opinion without ever directly referring to or criticizing
Justice Kennedy's opinion, the second clause in that statement does not
necessarily follow from the first.19 Specifically, there is no reason to
suppose that if the goal is to ensure equal opportunity for all children, the
best or most effective way of doing so is through racial integration. This
is in no way an endorsement of Justice Thomas' seeming desire to
elevate Justice Harlan's Plessy dissent 20 into binding constitutional
doctrine or with his rather tiresome obsession with color-blindness, 21 but
is rather a concession to one of his more cogent points, namely that,
given the historical evidence of the dangers of racial classification, any
justification of state-sponsored racial integration would have to show that
it is the best way of achieving the purpose of the Equal Protection
guarantee of equal opportunities.22  This Thomas critique, while
sometimes unnecessarily blunt and almost always shrill, is not just a
refutation of Kennedy's opinion but instead reveals a deeper flaw in the
reasons that have been offered and continue to be offered in favor of
racial integration. If, as Justice Kennedy put it, this Nation has a moral
and historical obligation to create an integrated society, then, quite apart
from the fact that the Supreme Court does not typically ground
constitutional rights in moral and historical obligations, it ought to be a
simple enough matter to explain exactly the basis of that historical and
23moral obligation. Yet nowhere in Justice Kennedy's opinion, or in
19. In rejecting the proposition that racial integration promotes equal educational
opportunities, Justice Thomas relied on examples from what he considered to be racially-
isolated schools, such as Dunbar High School in Washington D.C., to make the point that
"racial mixing is not necessary to black achievement." Id. at 2777 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
20. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552-64 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
21. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2782 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Most of the
dissent's criticisms of today's result can be traced to its rejection of the color-blind
Constitution. The dissent attempts to marginalize the notion of a color-blind Constitution
by consigning it to me and Members of today's plurality. But I am quite comfortable in
the company I keep. My view of the Constitution is Justice Harlan's view in Plessy:
'Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among
citizens."' (internal citations omitted)).
22. See id. at 2782-85.
23. To be sure, at least in the area of substantive due process the Court's
jurisprudence has rested in great part on what Justice Harlan described in his concurrence
in Griswold v. Connecticut as rights that are so deeply rooted in our tradition and so
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" that "neither liberty nor justice would exist if
they were sacrificed." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (quoting Palko
v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)) (Harlan, J., concurring); Palko, 302 U.S. at
326. However, the fact that the Court has often relied on this amorphous concept of
deeply-rooted tradition in its defense of such unenumerated rights as the right to privacy
has not led to it adopting as a matter of jurisprudential principle the proposition that
historical or moral obligations equal enforceable constitutional rights. If moral
obligations were indeed the equivalent of constitutional rights, then by now the Court
would have announced a constitutional right to food, shelter, or education. For a general
[Vol. 112:4
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Justice Breyer's much longer dissent in support of the voluntary school
plans at issue, is the basis of our historical and moral obligation ever
explained.
Part of the difficulty is that some of the race-conscious remedies,
such as affirmative action, which have been shown to result in a more
racially integrated society, are necessarily perceived as requiring hard
choices about who wins or loses in the contest for such valuable social
prizes as college admission, job promotions, or government contracts.24
But, part of the difficulty is also that the country has hardly ever been
unambiguously clear as to why racial integration is a good thing in the
first place. Since at least Brown 11,25 when it became clear that
something affirmative would need to be done to achieve integration,
jurists, activists, and scholars have struggled to offer at least six more or
less distinct reasons to explain why racial integration is a worthy societal
goal and why such race-conscious remedies as affirmative action or
state-sponsored racial integration, however controversial or painful, are
worth pursuing.
The first such justification is what may be called the collective sin
and redemption doctrine.26 Pursuant to that doctrine, slavery was the
Nation's original sin, which it compounded with state-sponsored
27segregation. For the Nation to repent for that sin, it needs to do
meaningful penance by seeking to integrate descendants of slaves with
the same fervor with which it excluded their forebears.28
discussion of the nexus (or absence thereof) between moral obligations and constitutional
rights, see Robin West, Unenumerated Duties, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 221 (2006).
24. See Michelle Adams, Intergroup Rivalry, Anti-Competitive Conduct and
Affirmative Action, 82 B.U. L. REv. 1089, 1098 (2002) ("[I]n American culture, blacks
and whites have historically acted, and continue to act, as competitor groups. The focus
of this competition is access to resources, power, and prestige. Historically, whites as a
group have been the winners of this competition, allowing them to build upon and lock-in
the advantages of previous successes. Affirmative action programs can be seen as a
government attempt to assist blacks, as a group, in securing some of these benefits.").
25. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 394 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown I1).
26. See DANIEL C. MAGUIRE, A NEW AMERICAN JUSTICE: ENDING THE WHITE MALE
MONOPOLIES 67, 90-91 (1980) (arguing that the nation bears a collective responsibility to
support affirmative action because "[p]atterned injustice requires patterned redress").
27. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 20 (2005)
("Slavery was the original sin in the New World garden, and the Constitution did more to
feed the serpent than to crush it.").
28. See CAROL M. SWAIN, THE NEW WHITE NATIONALISM IN AMERICA: ITS
CHALLENGE TO INTEGRATION 161 (2002) ("An older but compelling argument in favor of
affirmative action stresses its nature as a compensatory device ... many argue, and
affirmative action is no more than a late-and very meager-attempt to pay them back
for the centuries of unrequited toil and oppression which they have faced throughout their
long sojourn in America."); see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist.
No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2820 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[T]he interest [in racial
integration] possesses three essential elements. First, there is a historical and remedial
2008]
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The second such justification is one less concerned with grappling
with communal transgression than with assigning private responsibility.
Under this remedial doctrine, there is no such thing as collective sin, only
individual guilt; one can only remedy and compensate either for specific
acts of present discrimination or the lingering effects of past
discrimination committed by specific individuals or institutions.29
Specifically, "[t]he State... has a legitimate and substantial interest in
ameliorating, or eliminating where feasible, the disabling effects of
identified discrimination. '' 30 This view has not only been expressed by
the Supreme Court,3' but in time has come to be embraced by scholars
who perceive it as the only morally justifiable basis for race-conscious
remedies:
This... approach, which would be backward-looking, would root
affirmative action on a basis everyone seems to agree is morally
defensible, namely redress for past discrimination. This approach has
the advantage of intuitive defensibility, drawing as it does on the age-
old maxim that one should make amends for harms caused. It also
has the advantage of being well-established doctrinally, at least for
now; if one can show that one or one's class has been discriminated
against by some social institution, that institution may be ordered to
make amends in the form of affirmative action.
32
The third justification is the practical claim that the goal of racial
integration-and the true purpose of Brown I-is simply to guarantee
equal educational opportunities for blacks.33 The idea is perhaps best
element: an interest in setting right the consequences of prior conditions of segregation.
This refers back to a time when public schools were highly segregated, often as a result
of legal or administrative policies that facilitated racial segregation in public schools. It
is an interest in continuing to combat the remnants of segregation caused in whole or in
part by these school-related policies, which have often affected not only schools, but also
housing patterns, employment practices, economic conditions, and social attitudes.").
29. See Joint Statement, Constitutional Scholars' Statement on Affirmative Action
After City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 98 YALE L. J. 1711 (1989) ("Remedying the
lingering effects of racial discrimination has long been one of the most profound moral
and constitutional challenges facing our nation. Where discrimination has been so
pervasive that it has prevented many Americans from enjoying the basic privileges of
citizenship-an equal opportunity to buy homes, attend schools, attain government
contracts and find jobs-serious progress can be achieved only through strong efforts to
include minorities in areas from which historically they have been excluded.").
30. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978).
31. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative
Action Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 78, 91-92 (1986).
32. Richard Delgado, Why Universities Are Morally Obligated to Strive for
Diversity: Restoring the Remedial Rationale for Affirmative Action, 68 U. COLO. L. REV.
1165, 1166 (1997).
33. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-
Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 531-32 (1980) ("The educational benefits
[Vol. 112:4
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exemplified by Derrick Bell's existential cri-de-coeur that "racism lies at
the center, not the periphery; in the permanent, not in the fleeting; in the
real lives of black and white people, not in the sentimental caverns of the
mind. 34 As such, any time the races are separated, Blacks will remain in
Bell's phrase "faces at the bottom of the well" because, since
"[b]ecoming white mean[s] gaining access to a whole set of public and
private privileges that materially and permanently guaranteed basic
subsistence needs and, therefore, survival, 35 whites will always
discriminate in the allocation of resources in order to retain the "property
rights" of being white.36  The point of racial integration is not to
eliminate the psychological and emotional attachment to the privileges of
whiteness, but simply to make it more difficult to act upon them. When,
say, white controlled school boards decide to allocate funds to schools,
they will find it more difficult to discriminate in favor of white and
against black students if all children go to the same schools, read from
the same books, are taught by the same teachers, and eat lunch from the
that have resulted from the mandatory assignment of black and white children to the same
schools are also debatable. If benefits did exist, they have begun to dissipate as whites
flee in alarming numbers from school districts ordered to implement mandatory
reassignment plans. In response, civil rights lawyers sought to include entire
metropolitan areas within mandatory reassignment plans in order to encompass mainly
white suburban school districts where so many white parents sought sanctuary for their
children.... This approach to the implementation of Brown, however, has become
increasingly ineffective; indeed, it has in some cases been educationally destructive. A
preferable method is to focus on obtaining real educational effectiveness which may
entail the improvement of presently desegregated schools as well as the creation or
preservation of model black schools.").
34. DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF
RACISM 198 (1992). I do not at all mean to be flippant by characterizing professor Bell's
point about the permanence of racism as existential. His point is valid, if not irrefutable,
but there is indeed an existentialist element to his argument in the sense that it requires
one to hold in the mind two seemingly irreconcilable ideas that racism is such an
indelible mark on the American psyche that it will never be erased no matter how hard
we fight against it, and yet we must continue to fight against it in order to give our life
meaning:
We yearn that our civil rights work with be crowned with success, but what we
really want-want even more than success-is meaning. "Meaningfulness," as
the Stanford psychiatrist Dr. Irvin Yalom tells us, "is a by-product of
engagement and commitment." ... Continued struggle can bring about
unexpected benefits and gains that in themselves justify continued
endeavor.... [I]t is not a matter of choosing between the pragmatic
recognition that racism is permanent no matter what we do, or an idealism
based on the long-held dream of attaining a society free of racism. Rather, it is
a question of both, and. Both the recognition of the futility of action-where
action is more civil rights strategies designed to fail-and the unalterable
conviction that something must be done, that action must be taken.
Id. at 198-99 (emphasis in original).
35. Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1713 (1993).
36. Id.
2008]
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same cafeteria.37
The fourth justification for racial integration is the so-called
citizenship project. 38  Integration, particularly in early education, is a
moral imperative because it prepares students to live in the real world.3 9
As the Supreme Court puts it, elementary and secondary schools serve as
"a most vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic system
of government, and as the primary vehicle for transmitting the values on
which our society rests.,,40  The citizenship doctrine recognizes that,
37. But for a discussion of how nominally integrated schools use the practice of
ability-grouping to racially segregate students by classrooms see Janet Eyler et al.,
Resegregation: Segregation Within Desegregated Schools, in THE CONSEQUENCES OF
SCHOOL DESEGRAGATION 126-62 (Christine H. Rossell & Willis D. Hawley eds., 1983)
(describing how tracking and ability grouping isolate minority students into the lower
academic tracks in desegregated schools); see also Amy S. Wells & Robert L. Crain,
Perpetuation Theory and the Long-Term Effects of School Desegregation, 64 REV. EDUC.
RES. 531 (1994) (reviewing the research on the effects of ability grouping); Kevin G.
Welner & Jeannie Oakes, (Li)Ability Grouping: The New Susceptibility of School
Tracking Systems to Legal Challenges, 66 HARV. EDUC. REV. 451, 454-57 (1996)
(providing a history of court cases that deal with tracking and ability grouping in the
context of desegregation); Note, Teaching Inequality, The Problem of Public School
Tracking, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1318 (1989).
38. See Derek Black, Comment, The Case for the New Compelling Government
Interest: Improving Educational Outcomes, 80 N.C. L. REV. 923, 951-52 (2002) ("[A]s a
general matter, racially diverse schools operate as a means of improving overall racial
friendliness and reducing racial prejudice and stereotypes. By achieving these results
early, the benefits are more likely to accrue in the long term and be carried into
adulthood. Adults who went to racially diverse schools are more likely to attend diverse
colleges and universities, live in integrated neighborhoods, and work in racially diverse
settings. Furthermore, exposing students to diversity has been shown to improve
citizenship, increase political participation, and foster volunteering.").
39. For example, a 1999 study by the Department of Labor concluded that this skill
(that of functioning effectively in diverse settings) is essential for primary and secondary
school students to succeed in U.S. businesses. Sec'y Comm'n on Achieving Necessary
Skills, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Skills and Tasks for Jobs: A SCANS Report for America
2000, 1-3 to 1-4, 2-6 (1999), available at http://wdr.doleta.gov/opr/FULLTEXT/
1999_35.pdf. Congress has similarly found that it is in the nation's best interests to
prepare "all students to function well in a technologically oriented and a highly
competitive economy comprised of people from many different racial and ethnic
backgrounds." No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. § 7231(a)(4)(B) (2006).
For studies showing that interpersonal interaction in desegregated schools reduces racial
prejudice and stereotypes and improves students' citizenship values and their ability to
succeed in a racially diverse society in their adult lives, see Black, supra note 38, at 951-
52.
40. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (internal citations omitted); see also
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2821 (2007)
(Breyer, J., dissenting). The interest in racial integration possesses:
a democratic element: an interest in producing an educational environment that
reflects the 'pluralistic society' in which our children will live. It is an interest
in helping our children learn to work and play together with children of
different racial backgrounds. It is an interest in teaching children to engage in
the kind of cooperation among Americans of all races that is necessary to make
a land of three hundred million people one Nation.
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however inconvenient some might find this reality, the country is not and
will never be White and, as such, we might as well figure out how to live
with one another; and the only way to do so is to look for every
opportunity to foster integration: schools and the workplace being two
of the more obvious ones.4'
The fifth justification is the diversity rationale.42 The idea, of
course, being that individuals and institutions benefit in some way if they
represent as many diverse viewpoints as possible, including racial
diversity. The diversity argument has its origins in Justice Powell's
opinion for the Court in Bakke.43 While the Court found that the
University of California medical school affirmative action program
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Justice Powell suggested that
universities might successfully defend race-conscious admissions
policies if necessary to achieve racially diverse student bodies:
The atmosphere of "speculation, experiment and creation"-so
essential to the quality of higher education-is widely believed to be
promoted by a diverse student body.... [I]t is not too much to say
that the "nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide
exposure" to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation
of many peoples. Thus, in arguing that its universities must be
accorded the right to select those students who will contribute the
most to the "robust exchange of ideas," petitioner invokes a
countervailing constitutional interest, that of the First Amendment.
In this light, petitioner must be viewed as seeking to achieve a goal
that is of paramount importance in the fulfillment of its mission.
The sixth and final justification for racial integration is the so-called
Id. (internal citations omitted).
41. It is well established that public education "is a principal instrument in
awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training,
and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment." Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223. For
a summary of scholarly evidence in support of the citizenship project, see Janet W.
Schofield, School Desegregation and Intergroup Relations: A Review of the Literature,
17 REV. RES. EDUC. 335 (1991); Lee Sigelman & Susan Welch, The Contact Hypothesis
Revisited: Black-White Interaction and Positive Racial Attitudes, 71 Soc. FORCES 781
(1993); Amy Stuart Wells et al., How Desegregation Changed Us: The Effects of
Racially Mixed Schools on Students and Society 15-18 (2004), available at
http://cms.tc.columbia.edu/i/a/782_ASWells041504.pdf.
42. See Goodwin Liu, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: The Diversity
Rationale and the Compelling Interest Test, 33 RARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 381, 429 (1998)
("The diversity rationale seeks to vindicate well-established educational, social, and
constitutional values, and the policy choices it embodies-no less than those embodied
by the remedial rationale-are sufficiently 'compelling' to satisfy the demands of strict
scrutiny.").
43. See Regents ofUniv. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-15 (1978).
44. ld. at 312-13.
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communitarian principle-the idea being that, under a communitarian
regime where the common good and civic virtue are valued as highly as
individual rights and personal autonomy, racial integration is a useful
instrument with which the state can sponsor the Aristotelian vision of
citizens as members of the highest form of community.45  While the
communitarian argument would seem at first blush to be a mere
reformulation of the citizenship doctrine and the diversity rationale, it
actually differs from them in one important respect. Whereas the
citizenship project and the diversity rationale focus on the civilizing
effects and intellectual benefits that racial integration can bring to
specific individuals or institutions, the communitarian argument insists
that both the purpose of, and the impetus behind, racial integration ought
not to be on bestowing benefits to the individual but upon creating and
nurturing a healthy community.
46
Yet, the seeming embarrassment of riches when it comes to
justifications for racial integration is not so much proof of societal
commitment to it as it may be evidence of collective ambivalence toward
its purpose. And the fact that no one justification-not even the diversity
rationale-has taken firm root in our constitutional jurisprudence,
academic discourse, and in the body politic is not so much a reflection of
the intellectual weakness of any one of these arguments as it is perhaps a
sign that, for all the talk of the transcendent value of racial integration,
achieving it would appear to conflict with the individual liberty
principles upon which this country was supposedly founded.47 Indeed,
45. See Roy L. Brooks, The Affirmative Action Issue: Law, Policy, and Morality, 22
CoNN. L. REv. 323, 362 (1990) ("Certainly the strongest case for the morality of
affirmative action is its relation to a just society. Affirmative action helps to remind us
that the individual cannot achieve a good life without attending to the collective good.").
46. See id.
47. In legal academia, the diversity rationale has been critiqued from both "right"
and "left." From a "right" perspective, Former Attorney General William Bradford
Reynolds has argued:
We are all.., a minority in this country: a minority of one. Our rights derive
from the uniquely American belief in the primacy of the individual. And in no
instance should an individual's rights rise any higher or fall any lower than the
rights of others because of race, gender, or ethnic origin .... Any compromise
of this principle is discrimination . . . and such behavior is no more tolerable
when employed remedially, in the name of "affirmative action" or "racial
balance."...
William Bradford Reynolds, Individualism vs. Group Rights: The Legacy of Brown, 93
YALE L.J. 995, 1003-04 (1984). From the "left" perspective, Charles Lawrence argues:
The liberal defense of affirmative action ... participates in the production of an
ideology that justifies the re-segregation of the academy in the name of
equality. Justifications for affirmative action are often divided into two main
types. Arguments that focus on past and continuing discrimination against
minorities, women and other groups are often called "backward-looking."
They argue for affirmative action to make amends for or to rectify the effects of
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while each argument tends to draw its own particular form of critique, in
the final analysis what binds all these critiques together is this firm belief
in some circles and nagging suspicion in others that, however a worthy
social goal racial integration might be in theory, in practice, for the state
to try to promote, much less enforce, some ideal mixture of the races,
would represent a violation of individual liberty and an insult to human
dignity.
Thus, as early as Bakke, the Supreme Court flatly rejected any
notion of collective sin, labeling the very notion of "societal
discrimination" "an amorphous concept of injury that may be ageless in
its reach into the past., 48 As the Court put it:
[T]he purpose of helping certain groups ... perceived as victims of
"societal discrimination" does not justify a classification that imposes
disadvantages upon persons.., who bear no responsibility for
whatever harm the beneficiaries of the special admissions program
are thought to have suffered. To hold otherwise would be to convert
a remedy heretofore reserved for violations of legal rights into a
privilege that all institutions throughout the Nation could grant at
their pleasure to whatever groups are perceived as victims of societal
discrimination. That is a step we have never approved.
49
Nor has the Court been any more receptive to the notion of
individual blame, insisting in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, that
"distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by
their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded
past injustices. By contrast, "forward-looking" arguments for affirmative
action make sparing reference to past or current wrongdoing, and instead
defend affirmative action as a means to some desirable future goal. The liberal
or "diversity" defense articulates its purpose as "forward-looking" rather than
"backward-looking." In so doing, it begins with an implicit denial of the
defender's participation in or responsibility for past or contemporary racism.
The university seeks to prepare its students for future participation and
leadership in a racially diverse society and expresses no interest in reparations.
By looking only forward, it avoids any direct admission or acknowledgement
of the institution's past discriminatory practices, even when that discrimination
is de jure and of relatively recent vintage. It makes no effort to inquire into the
ways that current facially neutral practices may have a foreseeable and
unjustifiable discriminatory impact or to account for unconscious bias in their
administration. This denial concurs in and reiterates "the big lie," the anti-
affirmative action argument that pretends that white supremacy is extinct and
presupposes a color-blind world, a world in which race-conscious remedies
become invidious discrimination.
Charles R. Lawrence III, Two Views of the River: A Critique of the Liberal Defense of
Affirmative Action, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 928, 952-54 (2001).
48. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307.
49. ld. at 310.
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upon the doctrine of equality... ."50 This intolerance is necessary
because governmental racial discrimination of any sort is inherently
suspect, and so racial characteristics are almost never an appropriate
consideration for the government.
5'
To be sure, the Court has seemingly been more supportive of a
combination of the citizenship project, diversity rationale, and even
communitarian argument.52 Yet, even while claiming that diverse
schools help prepare "minority children for citizenship in our pluralistic
society, while, we may hope, teaching members of the racial majority to
live in harmony and mutual respect with children of minority heritage, 53
the Court has also refused to explicitly adopt the very explicit race-
conscious measures that would make this brave new world a reality,
54claiming that racial classification is an affront to human liberty, an
invitation to governmental abuse,
55 and the path to racial unrest.
56
Underlying the critique of each of these justifications for racial
integration is the reality that western thought in general-and American
jurisprudence in particular-has always drawn a sharp distinction
between so-called first-generation civil and political rights and second-
generation social and economic rights.57 In this dichotomous approach,
50. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 214 (1995) (quoting
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)).
51. Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 216.
52. In Grutter, the Court acknowledged the strong preference of employers for
workers whose skills have been developed "through exposure to widely diverse people,
cultures, ideas, and viewpoints." Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003). The
Court explained that a diverse learning environment better prepares students "for an
increasingly diverse workforce and society." Id.
53. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 472-73 (1982) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
54. See Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000) ("One of the principal reasons
race is treated as a forbidden classification is that it demeans the dignity and worth of a
person to be judged by ancestry instead of his or her own merit and essential qualities.").
55. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738,
2775 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[E]very time the government uses racial criteria to 'bring
the races together,' . . . someone gets excluded, and the person excluded suffers an injury
solely because of his or her race.... This type of exclusion, solely on the basis of race,
is precisely the sort of government action that pits the races against one another,
exacerbates racial tension, and 'provokes resentment among those who believe that they
have been wronged by the government's use of race."' (quoting Adarand Constructors,
515 U.S. at 241)).
56. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993) (Use of race "threaten[s] to
stigmatize individuals by reason of their membership in a racial group and to incite racial
hostility.").
57. For a review of the historical development of first and second generation rights,
see Stephen P. Marks, Emerging Human Rights: A New Generation for the 1980s?, 33
RUTGERS L. REV. 435, 437-38 (1981); for a comparative analysis of first and second
generation rights in American and European constitutional law, see Mary Ann Glendon,
Rights in Twentieth-Century Constitutions, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 519 (1992); for a critique
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the bundle of first-generation rights, including the rights to free speech,
free exercise of religion, political autonomy, bodily integrity, property,
and privacy, deserve absolute protection, whereas such social and
economic rights as the right to food, shelter, and adequate education may
be promoted only insofar as the state has the available resources to do
so. 5 8  Moreover, in this dichotomy of rights, first generation rights
deserve absolute protection because they go to the heart of individual
liberty, whereas second-generation rights represent a vision of the
common good, which if seriously enforced, in fact risk infringing upon
individual liberty.59 In short, this dichotomy of rights necessarily flows
and follows from our concept of individual autonomy as the highest form
of liberty, which should not be infringed by such state-sponsored
measures as racial integration even in the name of a larger common
good.
In this essay, I want to offer an alternative justification for state-
sponsored integration rooted not in historical or ethical or political
obligation, and not in a vision of communal virtue, but rather in a
conception of an individual due process right to community. In other
words, if individual liberty is indeed the highest expression of moral and
political philosophy, then I want to argue that community is itself an
individual liberty interest, and that the way out of the dilemma of how to
reconcile the communitarian ideal with the notion of individual liberty is
to imagine that the bundle of first-generation absolute rights, which
include the right to free speech, free exercise of religion, political
autonomy, bodily integrity, property, and privacy, must necessarily also
include an individual right to community.
Part I below revisits the notion of individual liberty as the
cornerstone of liberal moral and political philosophy. Part II presents the
communitarian moral and political challenge to classic liberal
philosophy. Part III argues for an individual right to community rooted
in classic liberal philosophy. Part IV concludes with a proposed
application of the right to community to the problem of racial integration.
In a forthcoming article, I intend to trace the decisional support for
of the dichotomy between first and second generation rights, see Jeanne M. Woods,
Emerging Paradigms of Protection for "Second-Generation" Human Rights, 6 LoY. J.
PUB. INT. L. 103 (2005).
58. See generally Cees Flinterman, Three Generations of Human Rights, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN A PLURALIST WORLD: INDIVIDUALS AND COLLECTIVITIES 75-76 (Jan Berting et
al. eds., 1990) (discussing the creation of the concept of generation of rights by French
scholar and diplomat Karel Vasak); see also Jennifer A. Downs, A Healthy and
Ecologically Balanced Environment: An Argument for a Third Generation Right, 3 DUKE
J. COMP. & INT'L L. 351, 358-62 (1993) (discussing the dichotomous framework between
first and second generation international human rights).
59. See Flinterman, supra note 58, at 76.
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an individual right to community in the Supreme Court's substantive due
process jurisprudence. Here and now, the modest point I wish to make
comes to this: If we are to take seriously the Enlightenment vision, upon
which the United States Constitution rests, that each individual possesses
equally a core bundle of rights necessary for human dignity and
freedom-if we are to take rights seriously-then that bundle of rights
must also include that without which the individual ceases to be human:
the right to community-the right to connect.
1. Individual Liberty as Moral and Political Philosophy
The Enlightenment placed individual liberty and autonomy at the
center of the political universe. °  In arguing, as John Locke,6' John
Stuart Mill,62 Immanuel Kant, 63 Jean-Jacques Rousseau64 and others did,
that the protection of individual physical, personal, and property rights is
the prime responsibility of the communal state, enlightenment thinkers
sought to "differentiate [their] political philosophy from the ancient and
medieval commitments to order and hierarchy. 65  In the place of an
authoritarian state that compelled obedience in the name of a Supreme
Being or hereditary sovereign, Locke, among others, insisted that the
state could earn allegiance only insofar at it recognized, respected and
protected the individual's inalienable autonomy and integrity.
66
60. For a general discussion of the relationship between the Enlightenment and the
development of liberal political democracies, see ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE:
A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 50-53 (1981).
61. See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 271 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge University Press 1988) (1690).
62. See JOHN STUART MILL, LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 14 (John Gray ed., Oxford
Univ. Press 1991) (1859).
63. See Immanuel Kant, On the Common Saying: "This May be True in Theory, but
it does not Apply in Practice, " reprinted in IMMANUEL KANT, POLITICAL WRITINGS 61, 75
(Hans Reiss ed., H. B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1793).
64. See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discours sur L'&conomie Politique, in 3 JEAN-
JACQUES ROUSSEAU, OEUVRES COMPLETES 239, 263 (Bernard Gagnebin & Marcel
Raymond eds., 1964) (1775). For an examination of Rousseau's philosophy and its
influence on American constitutionalism, see Nelson Lund, Rousseau and Direct
Democracy (with a Note on the Supreme Court's Term Limits Decision), 13 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 459 (2004).
65. IAN SHAPIRO, THE MORAL FOUNDATION OF POLITICS 14 (2003).
66. At the heart of Locke's political philosophy rests the notion that government
derives its legitimacy from the consent of the governed and from a trust relationship,
pursuant to which human beings willingly surrender unfettered exercise of rights they
enjoy in the state of nature in exchange for government respecting these rights:
[E]very Man, that hath any Possession, or Enjoyment, of any part of the
Dominions of any Government, doth thereby give his tacit Consent, and is as
far forth obliged to Obedience to the Laws of that Government, during such
Enjoyment, as any one under it; whether this his Possession be of Land, to him
and his Heirs for ever, or a Lodging only for a Week; or whether it be barely
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This enlightenment conception of the relationship between the
individual and the communal state rested on three distinct but related
ideas. The first posits that the individual exists in a state of nature as a
moral being independent of the community.67  This so-called "pre-
political '68 human being, as scholars have characterized it, exits in a state
of nature, free from government control and self-governed by certain
inherent and universal moral laws. According to Hobbes:
The RIGHT OF NATURE, which Writers commonly call Jus
Naturale, is the Liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he
will himselfe, for the preservation of his own Nature; that is to say, of
his own Life; and consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own
Judgement, and Reason, hee shall conceive to be the aptest means
thereunto.
69
Or as Rousseau put it, human beings in their natural state are fully
formed moral animals and "[a]ll institutions which put man in
contradiction with himself are worthless. 7 °
While Hobbes tended to view this state of nature as inherently
brutish and fundamentally archaic, thereby justifying surrendering
virtually unlimited power to the state, 71 he, like Locke and Rousseau,
travelling freely on the Highway; and in Effect, it reaches as far as the very
being of any one within the Territories of that Government.
LOCKE, Two-TREATISES, supra note 61, at 348 (emphasis in original).
67. Id. at 395-96 ("I will not dispute now whether Princes are exempt from the Laws
of their Countrey; but this I am sure, they owe subjection to the Laws of God and Nature.
No Body, no Power can exempt them from the Obligations of that Eternal Law.").
68. See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 88-119 (1974)
(discussing negative rights as being pre-political, natural rights of individuals); see also
Michael W. McConnell, Why Is Religious Liberty the "First Freedom "?, 21 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1243 (2000) (explaining that the dominant social philosophy in the United States
has been that individuals have "pre-political" moral rights and that the justification of the
state lies in the protection of these rights).
69. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 91 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1991) (1651).
70. JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND OTHER LATER POLITICAL
WRITINGS 147 (Victor Gourevitch ed. and trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997) (1762).
Admittedly, Rousseau differed from Locke and Hobbes in the value he placed upon
social order and community welfare. Indeed, he declared that "[a]s soon as public service
ceases to be the Citizens' principal business ... the State is already close to ruin." Id. at
113. But while Rousseau advocated for the exercise of collective power by famously
insisting that "whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be constrained to do so by
the entire body," id. at 53, like Locke and Hobbes, he subscribed to the first principle of
classic liberal moral and political philosophy that "[i]f one inquires into precisely what
the greatest good of all consists in, which ought to be the end of every system of
legislation, one will find that it comes down to these two principal objects,freedom and
equality," id. at 78 (emphasis in original).
71. In Leviathan, Hobbes described the State of Nature as an anarchic, lawless state
of "all against all," in which life was "solitary, poore [sic], nasty, brutish, and short."
HOBBES, supra note 69, at 89.
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viewed nature as its own moral universe, in which pre-political human
beings enjoyed inalienable rights of liberty and property, though
competition necessarily rendered as fragile the full enjoyment these
rights.7 2 Thus, Locke writes: "The State of Nature has a Law of Nature
to govern it, which obliges every one: And Reason, which is that Law,
teaches all Mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and
independent, no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty,
or Possessions. 73
The second principle follows from the first in that, inasmuch as pre-
political human beings do not derive their moral laws from the
communal state but come into the political state already possessing moral
norms, the communal state itself comes into being and retains its
legitimacy only inasmuch and insofar as it enforces the natural rights of
the pre-political animal.74 Thus, according to Locke:
[T]hough Men when they enter into Society, give up the Equality,
Liberty, and Executive Power they had in the State of Nature .... yet
it being only with an intention in every one the better to preserve
himself his Liberty and Property; (For no rational Creature can be
supposed to change his condition with an intention to be worse) .... 75
The third principle of the Kantian and Lockean moral and political
tradition concludes that, since human beings emerged from the natural
moral universe independent of the communal state, and since the
condition upon which the pre-political human being enters into political
society is one in which the state preserves the very liberty rights that are
man's natural due, then natural man may forever draw around himself a
circle of freedom into which the state, for all of its power, may never
enter.76 This inviolable circle of freedom includes the freedom to think,
to speak, to come and go, and to own or divest oneself of property. 77 As
72. See id. at 86-90.
73. LOcKE, Two TREATISES, supra note 61, at 271.
74. See McConnell, supra note 68, at 1258-64 (analyzing the notion that American
jurisprudence is grounded in the Lockean notion of the legitimacy of the state depends on
respect for and enforcement of individuals' pre-political rights).
75. LOCKE, Two TREATISES, supra note 61, at 353.
76. See Charles A. Reich, The Individual Sector, 100 YALE L.J. 1409, 1416 (1991)
(arguing that constitutional rights exists in order to "creat[e] a zone of freedom in a
society in which most people live their lives within, or in relationship to, large
bureaucratic organizations that are authoritarian, hierarchical, and dominating").
77. In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Supreme Court maintained that "[There] is
a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the
government may not enter." 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992). To be sure, the Court has never
explicitly catalogued those rights that make up this realm of freedom which the
government may not enter. Indeed, the closest the Court has come to delineating a core
set of rights is in Lawrence v. Texas, where Justice Kennedy declared: "Liberty protects




No-one can compel me to be happy in accordance with his
conception of the welfare of others, for each may seek his happiness
in whatever way he sees fit, so long as he does not infringe upon the
freedom of others to pursue a similar end which can be reconciled
with the freedom of everyone else within a workable general
law .... 78
In short, "so far," Locke writes, "as a man has power to think or not to
think, to move or not to move, according to the preference or direction of
his own mind ... a man free." 79
Of course, by now it is commonplace that our own constitutional
government is at its core a realization of the Enlightenment's conception
of the relationship between the individual and the state.80 Thomas
Jefferson was directly channeling Hobbes, Rousseau, and Locke when he
wrote in the Declaration of Independence "We hold these truths to be
self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by
their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life,
Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.' This vision of the
Enlightenment was embodied not just in the Declaration of Independence
but was also reflected in both the structure of government adopted by the
Constitution and in its open enumeration of individual rights.
82
places.... Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy of
self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct."
539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003). However, scholars have traditionally recognized that the
enlightenment conception of an inviolable realm is comprised of those rights necessary
for personhood and include liberty of conscience and freedom of thought, political
liberty, bodily integrity, and property rights. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 61
(1971).
78. KANT, supra note 63, at 74.
79. JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 315 (Alexander
Campbell Fraser ed., Dover Publications 1959) (1690); see also Alice Haemmerli, Whose
Who? The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 DUKE L.J. 383, 414 n.122 (1999)
("The key to Kant's moral and political philosophy is his conception of the dignity of the
individual. This dignity gives the individual person an intrinsic worth, a value sui generis
that is 'above all price and admits of no equivalent."' (quoting John Ladd, Introduction to
IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE ix (John Ladd trans. and ed.,
Library of Liberal Arts 1965) (1797))).
80. For a discussion of the thesis of the American Constitution as embodying a
Lockean philosophy of natural rights, see Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have An Unwritten
Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703, 715-16 (1975) ("For the generation that framed the
Constitution, the concept of a 'higher law,' protecting 'natural rights,' and taking
precedence over ordinary positive law as a matter of political obligation, was widely
shared and deeply felt. An essential element of American constitutionalism was the
reduction to written form-and hence to positive law--of some of the principles of
natural rights.").
81. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
82. For a discussion of the influence of Locke's theory of separation of powers on
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From a structural perspective, the Constitution embodied "a
philosophy of government, that was highly protective of individual
liberty and manifestly Lockean. Separation of powers between the
executive, legislative, and judiciary, with checks and balances built into
the system to prevent overweening government or, in the worst case,
tyranny, is straight from the classical liberal, Lockean playbook. , 83 The
structural check on governmental power kept faith with Locke's notion
that human beings voluntarily enter into society only in order to secure
rights they already possess. 84 As James Madison put it:
the sovereignty of the society as vested in & exercisable by the
majority, may do anything that could be rightfully done by the
unanimous concurrence of the members; the reserved rights of
individuals.., in becoming parties to the original compact
being beyond the legitimate reach of sovereignty, whenever
vested or however viewed.85
Indeed, the Federalist Papers, which may be said to contain the sum and
substance of the Founders' moral and political philosophy, emphasized
time and time again that the purpose of a three-branch government, with
each branch having the power to check the other, was to guarantee
individual freedom and autonomy.86
From a rights perspective, the Bill of Rights is frequently described
as a charter of "negative" liberties, protecting certain areas of individual
the structure of modem constitutions, see Suri Ratnapla, John Locke's Doctrine of
Separation of Powers: A Re-Evaluation, 38 AM. J. JuRis. 189, 218 (1993) ("Locke's
major contribution to modem constitutionalism was his persuasive argument that an
adequate separation of the law making and law executing functions is a sine qua non of a
constitution under which liberty is secure."). As for the thesis that the American
Constitution's enumerated Bill of Rights is Lockean in nature, see H. Richard Uviller &
William G. Merkel, The Second Amendment in Context: The Case of the Vanishing
Predicate, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 403, 556 (2000) ("The Anglo-Americans discovered
few, if any, new abstract rights during the years surrounding or following the Revolution.
Indeed, the rights enumerated in the first ten amendments would have been familiar to
Locke or even Cromwell as aspects of constitutionalist doctrine.").
83. Ellen Frankel Paul, Freedom of Contract and the "Political Economy" of
Lochner v. New York, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 515, 535 (2005).
84. See LOCKE, Two TREATISES, supra note 61, at 359 ("Men unite into Societies,
that they may have the united strength... and may have standing Rules to bound it, by
which every one may know what is his .... [T]hat they shall be govem'd by declared
Laws, or else their Peace, Quiet, and Property will still be at the same uncertainty, as it
was in the state of Nature.") (emphasis in original).
85. James Madison, Sovereignty (1835), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 570-
71 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1900-1910).
86. For a discussion of the Founders' vision of divided government as a guarantee of
individual autonomy, see THOMAS L. PANGLE, THE SPIRIT OF MODERN REPUBLICANISM:




freedom from state interference. 87 In the words of Judge Posner: "The
men who wrote the Bill of Rights were not concerned that government
might do too little for the people but that it might do too much to
them. 88 That is, in contrast to the modern European welfare state, with
its focus on government nurturing the welfare of its citizens, 89 the
American concept of rights, grounded as it is in classic liberal moral
philosophy, has always focused on the prevention of governmental
intrusion upon individual dignity and autonomy. These so-called "first-
generation" rights or "first-generation" constitutions emphasize the
notion that the purpose of government is first and foremost to respect the
natural rights belonging to pre-political human beings.90
In other words, first-generation rights serve as individual checks
against state power and, by requiring that "each person is to have an
equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar
liberty for others[,]" 9' provide the benchmark for measuring fairness,
justice and equality. These first generation rights, best exemplified by
the American Bill of Rights, includes, among others, the right to free
speech and free association, the right to free exercise of religion, the right
to vote, the right to property, and the right to bodily integrity.92 Thus, at
the heart of liberal moral and political philosophy is the belief, not just
that the individual, as autonomous being, stands apart from and in
opposition to the communal state, but more importantly that the first and
last role of the communal state-indeed, the very basis upon which the
legitimacy of the community's authority rests-is to make individuals
more autonomous.93 In short, if the rights of the individual predates and
87. David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
864, 886 (1986); see also, Randy E. Barnett, Are Enumerated Constitutional Rights the
Only Rights We Have? The Case of Associational Freedom, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
101, 103 (1987) ("[t]he standard for assessing the performance of government is its
efficacy in enforcing the pre-existing rights of individuals. ... According to this view,
then, individual rights come first and government, with all its various 'branches'and
federal-state 'separations,' comes second as a means of securing these fundamental
rights.... [T]he authors of our Constitution were very much influenced by the Lockean
philosophy of 'rights first-government second."').
88. Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983).
89. For a comparative discussion between American and European conceptions of
rights, see Glendon, supra note 57.
90. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
91. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 60 (1971); see also John Rawls, The Idea of
Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI L. REV. 765 (1997).
92. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings,
Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725, 727 (1998) ("Much of
American constitutional law is, of course, cast in the language of protecting individual
rights: rights to free speech, or to equal protection, or to democratic participation-to
vote, form parties, petition the government.").
93. See Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and
Possibilities, 1 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 7 (1989).
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are indeed independent of the community, then the true measure of a
healthy community lies not in the pursuit of some ephemeral communal
good but in the protection of these "prepolitical" individual rights.94
In its emphasis on individuals being free to think what they will, to
say what they will, to do with their bodies what they will, to associate
with and care for whom they will, to worship or not what they will, and
to do with their property what they will, the bundle of first-generation
rights not only harken back to the Lockean vision that freedom is power,
but, in effect, identifies the core of what it means to be free and
autonomous human beings who possess the same rights in the post-
political world as they enjoyed in the pre-political natural state.95 This
Lockean belief of an inviolable sphere of freedom is precisely that which
Justice Kennedy himself, consciously or not, was referring to when he
wrote in Lawrence v. Texas:
Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions
into a dwelling or other private places. In our tradition the State is
not omnipresent in the home. And there are other spheres of our lives
and existence, outside the home, where the State should not be a
dominant presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds.
Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of
thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct. The instant
case involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and in its more
transcendent dimensions.
96
That is, in addition to the political structure delineating the
relationship between the individual and the hierarchy of individual rights
which the state has an absolute obligation to respect, liberal moral and
political philosophy also offers a sort of taxonomy of the irreducible core
of human nature-in other words, a catalogue of that which is necessary
for us to function as moral human beings and without which we, in a real
sense, cease to be human. In short, take away our freedom to think, to
speak, to worship, to associate, to own property, to control our bodies,
and to shield our private selves from public view, and you take away an
essential piece of our humanity.
This conception of individual rights by necessity rejects the
argument that the rights of the individual ought to suffer any limit purely
for the benefit of the group:
For every human to have rights to these objects means that
94. See McConnell, supra note 68.
95. As Locke wrote: "The Natural Liberty of Man is to be free from any Superior
Power on Earth... but to have only the Law of Nature for his Rule." LOCKE, Two
TREATISES, supra note 61, at 283 (emphasis in original).
96. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
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they are the personal property of each human, so that each
person is in a morally justified position to claim, at least for
himself or herself, the protection of his or her necessary
conditions of action, even if majority preferences decree
otherwise. This, then, accounts for the supreme importance of
human rights both for individuals and for societies.
97
Or, as Professor Ronald Dworkin best summarizes it: "The prospect of
utilitarian gains cannot justify preventing a man from doing what he has
a right to do....
It is precisely this sort of absolute individualism that often
engenders the most direct attacks upon classical liberal moral and
political philosophy, with scholars arguing that "liberal rights are
excessively individualistic and therefore both self-contradictory and
unstable... ."99 As Professor Morton Horwitz puts it:
[N]atural rights conceptions were conceived in radical individualism
and continue to express an individualistic perspective on social
relations. Natural rights philosophy is rooted historically in an
adversarial vision of human interactions and a negative idea of
human freedom as the absence of external restraint. Its libertarian
premises lead to a minimalist "night-watchman" state and to
denunciation of social duties or legislation protecting the socially
weak as "paternalistic" or as redistributive. It is a frequent
observation that the revolutionary spin of the natural rights
philosophy of the Declaration of Independence was reshaped into a
conservative pro-property doctrine after the American Revolution,
especially in order to relegitimate slavery.
100
Still, the image of human beings as pre-political autonomous creatures,
whose rights can never be subservient to the amorphous demands of the
group, remains perhaps the single most powerful strand of our the
American constitutional narrative.101 As one commentator aptly puts it:
"For all of us raised in liberal societies, our deep attachment to freedom
takes its meaning and value from the presupposition of our self-
determining, self-making nature: that is what freedom is for, the exercise
97. Alan Gewirth, Human Rights and Conceptions of the Self, 18 PHILISOPHIA 129,
138 (1988).
98. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 193 (1977).
99. Bruce P. Frohnen, The One and the Many: Individual Rights, Corporate Rights
and the Diversity of Groups, 107 W. VA. L. REv. 789, 789 (2005).
100. Morton J. Horwitz, Responses to the Minority Critiques of the Critical Legal
Studies Movement, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 393, 399-400 (1988).
101. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Tuskegee Modern, Or Group Rights Under the
Constitution, 80 KY. L.J. 869, 880-81 (1992) ("No system of government can claim the
allegiance of all its citizens if it extends its protections to only those that are fortunate
enough to fall within a protected class.").
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of that capacity."
10 2
II. Communitarianism as Moral and Political Philosophy
In the face of liberalism's radical conception of the primacy of the
individual and individual rights, communitarianism stands in stark
contrast and describes a set of ideas, the foundation of which relies on
the tenets of community, moral education, and shared values. 0 3 Like
liberalism, communitarianism has roots in Western philosophy. 10 4 But,
whereas modern political liberalism is the fulfillment of the Lockean
vision, communitarianism is the yet unrealized hope for the Aristotelian
ideal that "it is ... surely paradoxical to represent the man of perfect
happiness as a solitary; for ... man is a social creature.. .'naturally
constituted to live in company."'
0 5
According to Aristotle, the "'natural impulse ... to live a social life'
is so strong 'that man is by nature an animal intended to live in a polis'-
to be a member of the highest form of community."'10 6  In Politics,
Aristotle explained that "the city belongs to the class of things that exist
by nature, and that man is by nature a political animal. 10 7 In contrast to
Enlightenment thinkers, Aristotle did not use the term "nature" in the
sense of a pre-political order of things, but rather in the sense that human
existence is improved or perfected when humans make the conscious
choice to engage in political collaboration.
10 8
In terms of morality, communitarians contend that the benchmark
for determining questions of right and wrong, or justice and equality, is
not some pre-political natural state, but the community's post-political
"ethos or Way of Life."' 10 9  These basic beliefs underlie the
102. Nedelsky, supra note 93, at 8.
103. See Kraig James Powell, The Other Double Standard: Communitarianism,
Federalism, and American Constitutional Law, 7 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 69, 74 (1996).
104. See Kevin Worthen, The Role of Local Governments in Striking the Proper
Balance Between Individualism and Communitarianism: Lessons for and from
Americans, 1993 B.Y.U. L.REv. 475, 478-79 (1993).
105. Id. at 478 (quoting ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 304 (J.A.K. Thomson
trans., Penguin Books 1976) (1953)).
106. Id. at 478-79 (quoting ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 128 (Earnest Barker trans., Oxford
Univ. Press 1995) (1946)).
107. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 10 (Earnest Barker trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1995)
(1946).
108. See Miriam Galdston, Taking Aristotle Seriously: Republican-Oriented Legal
Theory and the Moral Foundation off Deliberative Democracy, 82 CAL. L. REv. 329,
345-46 (1994).("Aristotle equates a thing's end with its best state, the condition of
something when it is self- sufficient. As a result, although Aristotle says it is evident that
the city is one of the things that exist by nature, he also maintains that the person who
first founded a city was the greatest of benefactors. This implies that cities or political
communities exist by nature only in the sense that they perfect human existence ... ").
109. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Communitarian Ethics and Legal Justification, 59 U.
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communitarianism of today, which re-emerged as a reaction to the
revival of a liberally dominated normative political theory in the
1970s.It° But, while modem communitarianism may have arisen as a
reaction to dominant liberal theology,111 in a real sense the work of the
new communitarians owe a great deal to the "views expressed in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by English liberals like John A.
Hobson and L.T. Hobhouse, and American pragmatists, especially John
Dewey. ' 12  Modem communitarians believe that liberalism is too
concerned with protecting individual autonomy and that it "does not
sufficiently take into account the importance of community for personal
identity, moral and political thinking, and judgements [sic] about our
well-being in the contemporary world."
'1 13
The communitarian idea is sometimes characterized as quite
"vague" and is often said to be "more often alluded to and hinted at than
explicated."' 14 Perhaps part of the reason is that modem communitarians
do not represent a single uniform position; they take on a variety of
viewpoints that span the political spectrum from left to right." 5  The
common denominator that brings them together is the central belief that
the self cannot exist "in physical and metaphorical isolation.
'' 16
Additionally, they believe "neither the liberal conception of the self nor
the corresponding vision of the polity makes much sense outside of the
realm of communal attachments."'" 17 Communitarians also contend that
"the neutral state is not sustainable over time; it will disappear in
irrelevancy just as soon as individual citizens recognize that it cannot
provide them with meaningful bonds."'"1 8 Beau Breslin, a communitarian
thinker, likens the modern communitarians to the Anti-Federalist
movement: "[I]nsofar as they continue to challenge the dominant
theoretical paradigms, they are the modern equivalent of the Anti-
Federalist movement-not fully a homogeneous band, but certainly
COLO. L. REv 721, 733-34 (1988).
110. Powell, supra note 103, at 69. For a history of modem communitarianism, see
Robert M. Ackerman, Tort Law and Communitarianism: Where Rights Meet
Responsibilities, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 649, 652-54 (1995).
111. See Philip Selznick, The Idea of a Communitarian Morality, 75 CAL. L. REv.
445, 445 (1987).
112. Id.
113. DANIEL BELL, COMMUNITARIANISM AND ITS CRITIcS 4 (1993).
114. Selznick, supra note 111, at 445.
115. BEAU BRESLIN, THE COMMUNITARIAN CONSTITUTION 31 (2004). Or, as Philip
Selznick puts it: "The quest for a communitarian morality is a meeting ground for
conservatives, socialists, anarchists, and more ambiguously, welfare liberals." Selznick,
supra note 111, at 445.
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representative of a generally consistent argument."' 19
Communitarians "advocate a 'politics of the common good,' in
which individual freedom would not be given exclusive priority in the
establishment of public policy.' 20 Instead, "the formulation of public
policy would serve as a vehicle to express and reinforce the
characteristics and views held in common by the members of a
community."' 2 1  In addition, "even coercive measures would be
permitted if they express the community's view of the public good."'
' 22
At the same time, communitarians recognize that rights are important.
23
A communitarian morality, however, "is not rights-centered;" from their
perspective "rights are derivative and secondary."124  Rather,
Communitarians believe that there is "a vital difference between
invoking rights out of a sense of duty, as a form of responsible conduct,
and doing so out of narrow self-interest.',
125
Communitarianism espouses the idea that "through the exercise of
our mutual responsibility to each other as citizens, we will build a stable
political community.' 26  To communitarians, "American society's
preoccupation with individual rights has diminished the capacity of both
the state and private institutions to solve effectively the problems that
plague our communities and threaten the social order."'' 27 As a result,
communitarians argue, "American society has lost sight of the
importance of civic duty and of the role of the family, the school, the
church, and the community in identifying and inculcating shared moral
values." 128 Michael Sandel, a well-known communitarian contributor, is
an advocate of this civic virtue, which is embodied in JFK's infamous
call to duty: "And so, my fellow-Americans, ask not what your country
can do for you. Ask what you can do for your country."'
129
Several noted communitarians have contributed significantly to this
modem school of thought. They include: Alasdair Maclntyre, Charles
Taylor, Michel Sandel, Michael Walzer, and Amitai Etzioni. All of these
key contributors address and attack in some way the liberalism outlined
in John Rawls' Theory of Justice. 1
30
119. Id.
120. Powell, supra note 103, at 74.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Selznick, supra note 111, at 454.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 455.
126. Wendy Brown-Scott, The Communitarian State: Lawlessness or Law Reform for
African-Americans?, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1209, 1210 (1994).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1210-11.
129. Selznick, supra note It11, at 454.
130. See, e.g., MACINTYRE, supra note 60, at 229-34.
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Both Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor disagree, as do most
communitarians, with the notion of the self "existing in physical and
metaphorical isolation. 131  Maclntyre best explains this concept in
relation to how he views his own role in society: "What I am ... is in
key part what I inherit, a specific past that is present to some degree in
my present. I find myself a part of a history and ... one of the bearers of
a tradition." 132 He suggests that "the specific tradition into which any
individual is born, and of which he is a part, entails roles and role-
expectations."' 133  Further, "[t]hese expectations in turn define what is
good or right within the particular tradition."'1 34 Charles Taylor argues,
"our identity is always partly defined in conversation with others or
through the common understanding which underlies the practice of our
society."' 135 He notes that "contemporary liberal society has suppressed
this simple truth."' 136 Today's "conception of individualism-or what he
calls 'atomism'"'-is meaningless because it rejects "any recognition of
the collective element in political society."' 137  According to Beau
Breslin: "Even the liberal concept of freedom, or of self-sufficiency
apart from society, Taylor suggests, cannot come from each individual
autonomously, but rather from a shared understanding of a heritage that
transmits those liberal principles."'
138
Michael Sandel challenges Rawls' theory of the "antecedently
individuated" person. 139 He "suggests that the liberal idea of the self as
unencumbered is impossible to conceive: an individual is not a
transcendent personality, nor is he divorced from attachments, aims,
assets, and so forth."' 140  Rather, the individual "is a person who is
constituted by his character, his surroundings, and his community.'
141
According to Breslin, Sandel's opinion is that:
a sense of identity can never be fully recognized unless we first
acknowledge our position within our varied social settings. Any
comprehension of the self, he argues, is impossible without a
131. BRESLIN, supra note 115, at 32.
132. MACINTYRE, supra note 60, at 206.
133. Hazard, supra note 109, at 734.
134. Id.
135. BRESLIN, supra note 115, at 39 (quoting Charles Taylor, Alternative Futures:
Legitimacy, Identity and Alienation in Late Twentieth Century Canada, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIETY IN CANADA 209 (1985)).
136. BRESLIN, supra note 115, at 39.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. BRESLIN, supra note 115, at 39; see MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM, AND THE
LIMITS OF JUSTICE 64 (1982); see also Michael J. Sandel, The Procedural Republic and
the Unencumbered Self 12 POL. THEORY 81 (1984).
140. BRESLIN, supra note 115, at 39.
141. Id. (citing Sandel, The Procedural Republic, supra note 139).
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corresponding conception of the society in which we live; for identity
is formed by those exact associations and commitments that an
individual makes as part of a political community.1
42
Furthermore, Sandel declared: "For to have character is to know that I
move in a history I neither summon nor command, which carries
consequences nonetheless for my choices and conduct."'1
43
Under Michael Walzer's theory of justice, "justice inherently
reflects a society's shared traditions."'144  Furthermore, "[d]ifferent
societies and cultures have different traditions; thus, even if the
promotion of a particular form of justice is appropriate in one society, the
same may not be true for the others."'145 According to Professor Carlos
Ball, "Walzer emphasizes the need to distribute social goods according
to a society's definitions of those goods, and not through objective or
universal standards of justice that are outside of the shared traditions of
the particular society in question.' ' 146  This results in what he calls. a
"complex equality," making it impossible for beliefs outside of the
community to dominate. 147
Amitai Etzioni is "the political voice of communitariansim. '14' As
a sociologist, some have argued that he essentially founded the modem
communitarian movement "to disseminate communitarian policy
prescriptions to the public and policymakers and to make the case for a
centrist way between radical individualism and authoritarian
moralism."'149 Etzioni maintained that, while it was necessary to replace
the oppressive moral order of the 1950s that tolerated the subjugation of
women and racial minorities, the radical revolution of the 1960s, for all
of its socially beneficial achievements, also led to "unbounded
relativism, situational ethics, and excessive individualism."' 150 Thus, he
advocated for a new balance in the social order between rights society
owed to individuals and duties individuals owed in return to society.'
51
In one of his many communitarian works, New Communitarian Thinking,
142. BRESLIN, supra note 115, at 38.
143. Id. (quoting Sandel, The Procedural Republic, supra note 139, at 90).
144. Carlos A. Ball, Communitarianism and Gay Rights, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 443,
484 (2000).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 484-85.
147. Id.
148. Michele Estrin Gilman, Poverty and Communitarianism: Toward a Community-
Based Welfare System, 66 U. PITT. L. REv. 721, 778 (2005).
149. Id.; see also Ackerman, supra note 110, at 652.
150. AMITAI ETZIONI, NEXT: THE ROAD TO THE GOOD SOCIETY 21 (2001); see also
Gilman, supra note 148, at 778.





I assume... that individuals and communities are constitutive of one
another, and their relationship is, at one and the same time, mutually
supportive and tensed. The mutual character of the relationship
between individuals and communities also suggests that any effort to
advance one at the expense of the other is likely to undermine the
important benefits that arise from keeping these two essential factors
in proper balance.1
52
Challenges to communitarianism have traditionally emerged on two
fronts: a liberal critique153 and a critical studies challenge.1
54
The liberal critique proceeds either by questioning the political
viability of communitarianism, 155 or by defending the moral worth of
liberalism. 56  In challenging the viability of communitarianism as a
political system, liberal critics argue that the notion of the common good
by definition depends on first identifying the particular community the
values of which members of the group supposedly share. 57 However,
most individuals do not belong to a single community but to multiple
groups that may often have conflicting values. 158 Liberal critics, then,
argue that "while some of these communities do embrace unified moral
and political views, the communities least likely to exhibit such
ideological unity are those defined by jurisdictional units of
government. 0 59 As such, the political decision-making process is ill-
suited for arriving at answers on questions of the common good because
"one could apply the most sophisticated arts of the gerrymanderer and
still be hard pressed to discern contiguous territories, of any substantial
size, which are not checkerboards inhabited by persons with different
cultural and religious identities.'' 160  As Kraig Powell accurately
summarizes this liberal critique:
On any given question of public policy, people's various religious,
moral, and political beliefs produce a host of conflicting views over
152. Amitai Etzioni, Old Chestnuts and New Spurs, in NEW COMMUNITARIAN
THINKING: PERSONS, VIRTUES, INSTITUTIONS, AND COMMUNITIES 16-17 (Amitai Etzioni
ed., 1995).
153. See WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE (1989).
154. See Ball, supra note 144.
155. See KYMLICKA, supra note 153, at 86 (arguing that the difficulty with the
communitarian ideal of the common good is that on most social issues different groups
will have different conceptions of the common good).
156. See STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES: CITIZENSHIP, VIRTUE, AND
COMMUNITY IN LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 28-29 (1990).
157. Id. at 28.
158. Id.
159. Powell, supra note 103, at 76.
160. Id. at 76 (quoting MACEDO, supra note 156, at 29).
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the most appropriate course to pursue. Enforcing anyone's particular
conception of the best policy necessarily excludes conceptions held
by others, thus demonstrating that there is no societal consensus on
the nature of "the common good."
16 1
In defending the moral worth of liberalism, critics of
communitarianism argue that political communitarianism ignores the
realities of individual identity. According to Powell, this individual
identity is manifested in the capacity to revise one's commitments so as
not to be irrevocably tied to any particular trait, despite his or her
connection to community. 162 By forcing people to adopt commitments
defined for them by the political majority, the result is communitarian
prevention from engaging in constructive self-definition and self-
expression.16 3  Ultimately, liberal critics oppose communitarianism
because granting democratic majorities the authority to determine public
policy allows for the possibility of "excessive constraints on individual
freedom."'' 64  "Liberal theorists argue that even if the possibility of
identifying the political norms espoused by a particular community is
conceded, enforcing those norms through the use of state power is often
unduly repressive."'
165
In addition to the liberal critique, communitarianism has also had to
confront challenges posited by critical studies scholars who view
communitarianism as a potential, but flawed, alternative to liberalism.'
66
These critics wonder whether, insofar as "community" is synonym for
"majority," the common good may well be a proxy for excluding and
oppressing minority groups. 167 That is to say, if under communitarianism
the dominant group is the source of values, it would seem to follow that
when those values conflict with those of subordinate groups,
communitarianism becomes the means by which the majority imposes its
161. Powell, supra note 103, at 75.




166. See ELIZABETH FRAZER & NICOLA LACEY, THE POLITICS OF COMMUNITY: A
FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF THE LIBERAL-COMMUNITARIAN DEBATE 140 (1993); Marilyn
Friedman, Feminism and Modern Friendship: Dislocating the Community, in FEMINISM
AND COMMUNITY 187-207 (Penny A. Weiss & Marilyn Friedman eds., 1995); Ball, supra
note 144; see also Mary Lyndon Shanley, Liberalism and the Future of Democracy, 49
STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1290 (1997) (reviewing MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S
DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1996)) ("The story that
[communitarianism] tells is suffused with a nostalgia that distorts the historical record by
ignoring instances in which appeals to community values would have deprived members
of minority groups of a political voice; it is a story that glides over and obscures
oppression.").
167. See Brown-Scott, supra note 126, at 1219.
[Vol. 112:41014
ONLY CONNECT
will on "politically powerless minorit[ies].' 68  In his article on
communitarianism and gay rights, Carlos Ball best expresses this critical
studies critique:
Furthermore, as some feminists have pointed out, reliance on and
glorification of given communities that are constitutive of identity, as
proposed by Sandel and other communitarians such as Alasdair
Maclntyre, is problematic. While Sandel speaks of the virtues of
school, family, church, and neighborhood for inculcating in
individuals a sense of citizenship, he is disappointingly silent about
the negative social forces, such as racism, sexism, and homophobia,
which sometimes emanate from those very same communities.
Ball goes even further to criticize Sandel's disinterest in
communities of choice or individualistic conceptions of communities.
Ball asserts that for some groups, like gay men and lesbians, the
voluntary communities are the only ones they have to rely on because the
constitutive communities, like family and church, have rejected them.i70
Or, as Wendy Brown-Scott notes, "[c]ommunitarians fail... to articulate
how the state will mediate the conflicts among differently situated groups
to avoid perpetual domination of minority groups.... Thus, the
potential of the communitarian state to eradicate racism and lawlessness
remains unclear."171
III. The Individual Right to Community
In recent years, the competing moral and political visions of the
classic liberal and modem communitarian philosophies have played out
across a wide range of subjects including, among others, normative and
descriptive theories of the legislative process and the regulatory state, 
1 72
interpretations of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution, 173 and the proper limits of the Second Amendment's right
168. Gilman, supra note 148, at 740; see also Brown-Scott, supra note 126, at 1216-
19.
169. Ball, supra note 144, at 476-77.
170. Id. at 475.
171. Brown-Scott, supra note 126, at 1221.
172. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIV1NG THE
REGULATORY STATE (1990); Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure
Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371 (1983); Steven P. Croley, Theories of
Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1998);
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice
Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275 (1988); Galdston, supra note
108; Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105
HARV. L. REV. 1512 (1992); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in
Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543 (1986).
173. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
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to bear arms. 17 4 But, perhaps no debate has been more bitterly fought
than that over whether the Constitution recognizes only individual rights
consistent with classic liberal theory, or whether it permits the
recognition of group rights in accordance with communitarian
thinking' 75 Particularly on the question of race-conscious measures
designed to achieve racial integration, the lines have been sharply drawn.
Indeed, the statement by Chief Justice Roberts in Parents Involved
that accepting racial balancing as a compelling state interest is "contrary
to our repeated recognition that '[a]t the heart of the Constitution's
guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command that the
Government must treat citizens as individuals, not as simply components
of a racial, religious, sexual or national class[;]"",176 and the retort by
Justice Breyer that when it comes to racial education in primary and
secondary schools, there is "an interest in teaching children to engage in
the kind of cooperation among Americans of all races that is necessary to
make a land of three hundred million people one Nation,"'177 is a
jurisprudential summation of a long-standing scholarly debate. This
academic back-and-forth holds, on the one hand, that "[o]ur rights derive
from the uniquely American belief in the primacy of the individual[;]"'
178
and on the other that "[w]e are born into certain groups, others we
choose, and still others choose us. Life[,] not subject to the call of
groupness[,] is as difficult for us to imagine as life not subject to the
individuating call of personhood...., 79
But, while in time communitarianism may yet achieve judicial
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985); Jeffrey M. Gaba, John Locke and the Meaning of the Takings
Clause, 72 Mo. L. REv. 525 (2007); Thomas W. Merrill, Dolan v. City of Tigard:
Constitutional Rights as Public Goods, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 859 (1995).
174. See, e.g., Thomas M. Moncure, Jr., The Second Amendment Ain't About Hunting,
34 How. L.J. 589 (1991); William Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the
Personal Right to Arms, 43 DUKE L.J. 1236 (1994); David Yassky, The Second
Amendment: Structure, History, and Constitutional Change, 99 MICH. L. REv. 588
(2000).
175. See, e.g., Katharine Inglis Butler, Affirmative Racial Gerrymandering: Fair
Representation for Minorities or a Dangerous Recognition of Group Rights?; 26
RUTGERS L.J. 595 (1995); Robert N. Clinton, The Rights of Indigenous Peoples as
Collective Group Rights, 32 ARiz. L. REv. 739 (1990); Ronald R. Garet, Communality
and Existence: The Rights of Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 1001 (1983); Bernadette
Meyler, The Limits of Group Rights: Religious Institutions and Religious Minorities in
International Law, 22 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 535 (2007); Eric J. Mitnick, Three
Models of Group-Differentiated Rights, 35 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 215 (2004);
Reynolds, supra note 47; Laura S. Underkuffler, Human Genetics Studies: The Case for
Group Rights, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICs 383 (2007).
176. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2757
(2007) (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995)).
177. Id. at 2821 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
178. See Reynolds, supra note 47, at 1003.
179. Garet, supra note 175, at 1070.
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recognition of group rights on par with individual rights, at present it
would not seem likely that the community will soon displace the
individual at the heart of American constitutional jurisprudence; for now,
at least, Locke's man does indeed reign supreme over Aristotle's polis.
That is not to say that, if the community is to remain
jurisprudentially subservient to the individual, the communitarian pursuit
of placing social virtue at the heart of constitutional interpretation must
also remain a lost cause. In fact, while their views of the relationship
between the individual and the communal state may indeed differ, both
the liberal and communitarian philosophies offer more than just a
political formula and catalogue of rights for democratic governance.
Each theory, in its own way, is a depiction of human nature and
delineation of human needs. Both the liberal vision and the
communitarian ideal carry an image of what it means be a free,
conscious and autonomous human being-an image of what it is that
makes us human and what it is, when lacking, robs us of our humanity.
To the classic liberal, to be human is to be left alone to do as one will so
long one's pursuit of freedom does not infringe upon that of another; or
as Charles Reich puts it: rights "creat[e] a zone of freedom in a society in
which most people live their lives within, or in relationship to, large
bureaucratic organizations that are authoritarian, hierarchical, and
dominating."' 180 To the communitarian, to be human is to bind oneself to
all the communal ties that shape one's past, shape one's character, and
define one's morality; or, as Alasdair Macintyre puts it: "What I am...
is in key part what I inherit, a specific past that is present to some degree
in my present. I find myself a part of a history and.., one of the bearers
of a tradition." 
181
While the point of this essay is not to wade once again in the debate
between the superiority of the liberal vision as opposed to the
communitarian ideal, it is difficult to see how the liberal conception of
the individual, however much it may have served as a robust intellectual
foundation for a constitutional jurisprudence of rights, actually resembles
real people. I say this not to be facile but to make the point that the
liberal pre-political person may reside in the United States Constitution
but he or she does not actually exist in real life. And, unless one is
prepared to defend this view of the individual with an appeal to a
Supreme Being as the creator of this pre-political and anatomistic human
being, nothing in the biological or social sciences, in our anthropological
past or daily experience, supports the liberal vision of the human being
as a fully formed, autonomous moral agent independent of the
180. Reich, supra note 74, at 1416.
181. MACINTYRE, supra note 60, at 206.
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community, whose most essential need is to be left alone in a
metaphorical room of his or her own to do what he or she will.
Yes, it may indeed be a denial of a person's core humanity to strip
them of the right to speak, to think, to worship, to care for their own, to
control and protect their bodies, and to choose their civic and political
leaders. But, while it is arguable that many of these supposedly universal
human values are in fact culturally determined, social and biological
sciences do show that the one sure way of robbing individuals of their
humanity is to isolate and radically cut them off from the community,
just as the one sure way of reinforcing an unhealthy body politic is to
encourage individuals to congregate into discrete groups with the
primary purpose of labeling others as not deserving of membership in the
community.
Whether one uses as evidence the need for infants to bond with their
caretakers so that they may develop into mature beings,'82 or the
psychological and physical deterioration prisoners experience when kept
in solitary confinement, 183 or the nearly universal cultural practice of
sending into actual or metaphorical exile members who violate the
group's moral norms, 184 or the American experience with chattel slavery
and racial segregation and the South-African experience of racial
apartheid, or the historical evidence of societies devising a recipe for
mass murder by sharply drawing a distinction between us and them,185 it
182. See generally MARY D. SALTER AINSWORTH ET AL., PATrERNS OF ATrACHMENT:
A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE STRANGE SITUATION (1978); 1 JOHN BOWLBY,
ATTACHMENT AND Loss: ATTACHMENT (1969); 2 JOHN BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND Loss:
SEPARATION: ANXIETY AND ANGER (1973); 3 JOHN BOWLBY, A SECURE BASE: PARENT-
CHILD ATTACHMENT AND HEALTHY HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (1988); Cindy Hazan &
Phillip Shaver, Romantic Love Conceptualized as an Attachment Process, 52 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 511 (1987).
183. See generally Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, Regulating Prisons of the Future: A
Psychological Analysis of Supermax And Solitary Confinement, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 477 (1997); Peter Scharff Smith, The Effects of Solitary Confinement on
Prison Inmates: A Brief History and Review of the Literature, 34 CRIME & JUST. 441
(2006); Bryan B. Walton, Student Article, The Eighth Amendment and Psychological
Implications of Solitary Confinement, 21 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 271 (1997).
184. See generally Patrice H. Kunesh, Banishment as Cultural Justice in
Contemporary Tribal Legal Systems: A Postscript on Quair v. Sisco, 37 N.M. L. REV.
479 (2007); James Lindgren, Why the Ancients May Not Have Needed a System of
Criminal Law, 76 B.U. L. REV. 29 (1996); Wm. Garth Snider, Banishment: The History
of Its Use and a Proposal for Its Abolition Under the First Amendment, 24 NEW ENG. J.
ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 455 (1998); Corey Raybum Yung, Banishment by a
Thousand Laws: Residency Restrictions on Sex Offenders, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 101
(2007).
185. See Louis Rene Beres, Genocide, Death and Anxiety, A
Jurisprudential/Psychiatric Analysis, 10 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 281, 311 (1996) ("At
its very heart, the problem of genocide and genocide-like crimes is largely one of
individual meaning. Ever anxious of drawing such meaning from their own inwardness,
human beings draw closer and closer to the herd. Sometimes the unity arises from the
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is clear that the right to connect with members of a larger community is
as deep and innate a part of human nature as the right to be left alone. As
such, if the basis for the post-political rights owed to Locke's pre-
political being is that these rights are merely the political recognition of
man's true nature, then it would follow that a liberal moral and political
philosophy that excludes man's natural attachment to community is
necessarily incomplete. What's more, if, as Rousseau argued, "[a]ll
institutions which put man in contradiction with himself are
worthless[,]' 186 it follows that a constitutional jurisprudence that refuses
to recognize this natural right to community sets "man in contradiction
[to] himself' and is, therefore, "worthless."
And no, it is not an answer to say that the natural impulse to
community is reflected and honored in free speech associational rights.
It is not. What I call the right to community is fundamentally distinct
from a free speech right to association, which in the final analysis, is
nothing more than the right to exclude others by selectively choosing
those with whom one associates. In other words, if speech and privacy
rights mean anything, it is not just the right to be left alone in the
proverbial room of one's own, but also the right to invite into the room a
select few of one's choosing and to shut the door to all others. By
contrast, the right to community cannot be reduced to a desire to
associate with those with whom one shares political, economic, or
intellectual interests, or with those to whom one is tied by cultural,
religious, geographic, racial, or family, or even romantic bonds. Rather,
the right to community is a right that expresses the humanistic impulse to
step outside of oneself and to move toward sympathy and understanding
of others different from oneself; it recognizes not exclusionary
associational ties but inclusionary community connections; it encourages
social relations that weave tight bonds among diverse members of the
group; it requires not a life cut down into associational fragments but one
open to a communal whole; and, above all, it flows not to the group but
to the individual. It is, in short, an individual liberty right, not a
communitarian group interest.
IV. Racial Integration as a Right to Community
Every attack upon race conscious educational remedies, from Bakke
to Hopwood, from Grutter to Parents Involved, has been premised upon
Class, sometimes from the Tribe, Church, Race, and State. But whatever the claims of
the particular moment, the herd spawns hatreds and excesses that make genocide
possible. Fostering an incessant refrain of 'us' versus 'them' it prevents each person
from becoming empathetically fully human and encourages each person to celebrate the
death of 'outsiders."').
186. See RoUSSEAu, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 70, at 147.
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the argument that race conscious remedies victimize the innocent
individual who, in part because of his or her race, is denied the particular
social benefit of attending the exact school of his or her choice. 187 In the
face of this denial of an individual right, appeals to the interest of the
community to build a diverse body of members, or to train members into
responsible citizens, or even to inculcate shared moral values, rarely
succeed because they run up against the liberal vision of the primacy of
the individual over the group.188 But, race-conscious remedies can be
defended not in the name of communal interest but as a matter of the
individual right to community of those who, because of their race,
become part of that community.
In Parents Involved, the Court took great pains to explain what it
perceived as an injustice to the children and parents who, supposedly
because of their race, did not attend the school of their first choice.
1 89
But left virtually unspoken was the story of those parents and those
children who, because of the Seattle and Louisville voluntary racial
integration plans, were perhaps for the first time, able to expand the
boundaries of their communities-to, in other words, cease living a life
in fragments. And by a life lived in fragments, I do not mean to refer just
to so-called poor, disadvantaged minority kids and families, whose
horizons are supposedly expanded when they come into contact with
their white, more privileged counterparts. Insofar as Justice Thomas
187. See Goodwin Liu, The Causation fallacy: Bakke and the Basic Arithmetic of
Selective Admissions, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1045-46 (2002) ("Although the most
recent legal challenges to racial preferences in university admissions vary in their details,
they are unified by a common narrative-the same narrative that animated Allan Bakke's
lawsuit against the Davis Medical School over twenty years ago. Bakke won admission
to the medical school after convincing the Supreme Court that the school's practice of
setting aside sixteen out of 100 seats in each incoming class for minority students was an
unconstitutional racial quota.... This prompted Bakke to complain that affirmative
action cost him a letter of admission, and the success of his lawsuit confirms what so
many people find unfair about affirmative action: By according substantial preferences to
minority applicants, affirmative action causes the displacement of deserving white
applicants like Allan Bakke and the plaintiffs now following in his footsteps."); see also
Cecil J. Hunt, II, The Color of Perspective: Affirmative Action and the Constitutional
Rhetoric of White Innocence, II MICH. J. RACE & L. 477 (2006) (examining the Supreme
Court's internalization of the rhetoric of the white victim in its affirmative action
jurisprudence); Ronald Turner, The Too-Many-Minorities and Racegoating Dynamics of
the Anti-Affirmative-Action Position: From Bakke to Grutter and Beyond, 30 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 445, 449-50 (2003) (arguing that one of the main obstacles to race-conscious
remedies is the concept of "racegoating," pursuant to which aggrieved individuals
"believe that they lost out to undeserving minorities and are the 'victims' of affirmative
action").
188. See supra Part I (discussing individual liberty as the foundation of American
political philosophy).




insists that this point of view is morally demeaning and factually
unsupported,1 90 he does have a point. What I do mean is that the Seattle
and Louisville school districts, and every other school district around the
country struggling with voluntary integration, recognize that a segregated
life of any race or any class is a life lived in fragments-a life, as
Rousseau would have it-that sets man in contradiction with himself.
Their voluntary racial integration plan, though perhaps less than perfect
in every respect, should not be seen as a weak attempt to atone for the
national sin of slavery, or a remedial gesture to ease the sting of past
discrimination, or even a vague mission to teach citizenship or promote
group diversity. It should be understood as a realization that the
individual parents and children who become part of these plans have an
individual fight to community that is a counterweight to any individual
equal protection right of parents and children who object to the plans.
Conclusion
I will leave for another time an examination of the decisional
support for the right to community in the Supreme Court's substantive
due process jurisprudence. Such an examination will show that the
individual right to community is as firmly rooted in the Constitution and
the Court's decisions as its closest jurisprudential mirror image: the
individual right to privacy. 191 The sole-but crucial-point I have tried
to make in this essay is that, if there is any hope that such a right will
ever command the same respect as the right to privacy, it will not be
enough to defend it on precedential ground. It will also be necessary to
argue that our liberal tradition of moral and political philosophy is not
only an invitation to retreat into Virginia Woolf s room of one's own,
1 92
190. See id. at 2777 (Thomas, J., concurring).
191. The irony is not lost on me that I propose here to use a rights model to defend a
communitarian ideal when one of the critiques communitarianism levels at liberal
theology is that it harbors an unhealthy obsession with rights and more rights. But, as
others have pointed out, communitarianism is not necessarily hostile to the concept of
rights; only to the focus on individual rights to the exclusion of civic responsibilities.
Philip Selznick explains:
A communitarian morality is not rights-centered, but it is not opposed to rights
or indifferent to them or casual about them. From the perspective of
community, however, rights are derivative and secondary. Duties tell us what
we must do; they summon us to action. Rights, however, .... do not provide
reasons for acting, at least not for the people who have them. We may or may
not invoke the rights we have or think we have. That decision tells us a great
deal about character and civic virtue. There is a vital difference between
invoking rights out of a sense of duty, as a form of responsible conduct, and
doing so out of narrow self-interest.
Selznick, supra note 111, at 454-55 (internal quotes and citations omitted).
192. VIRGINIA WOOLF, A RooM OF ONE'S OWN (1929).
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but also an obligation to abide by E. M. Forster's admonition to live in
fragments no longer, but only connect.
193
193. FORSTER, supra note 1.
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